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REPLY BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
Respondents state in their conclusion that the 
trial of this matter resulted in a fair hearing to all 
parties; that appellants went to the jury with limited 
residential land use as the theory of their case and 
Yalue based thereon; and that this was a decision of 
their own making, a choice made in litigation which 
cannot be now abandoned or recanted. 
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It is clearly evident from the record of this case 
that the statement of respondent is not true, appel-
lants were not permitted to develop their theory of 
the case and therefore appellants did not have a fair 
hearing of the case. 
It is felt this brief is made necessary because 
of a different position taken by respondent on the 
law in its appeal brief from that taken at the trial 
' and an unwarranted interpretation of appellants' 
evidence at the trial. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS WERE D E N IE D THE 
RIGHT TO PUT ON ANY EVIDENCE RELAT-
ING TO PROBABLE REZONING OF THE SUB-
JECT PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff in its answering brief takes the posi-
tion that excerpts taken from the transcript by ap-
pellants relating to objections and rulings on the 
subject of possible rezoning of the condemned prop-
erties were "out of context," (Br. 18) and that "no 
foundation of probability" of rezoning was laid. (Br. 
23) However, no effort was made to show wherein 
the quoted material was out of context. Appellants 
contend that the entire trial was "out of context" in 
a very real sense because the quoted excerpts are but 
a few of many similar quotes, as will be hereinafter 
pointed out, that constitute the rule, rather than the 
exception, of the nature of the obstacles placed in the 
road of the landowners' case. 
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In plaintiff's brief objecting to appellants' Mo-
tion for New Trial, plaintiff took a somewhat differ-
ent position from that taken in its brief before this 
Court as is evidenced by the following quote : 
Even were it proposed (which plaintiff wholly 
resists) that a probability of future zoning 
change may be evidenced in an imminent do-
main trial, ... (Italics added) (R. 145) 
The words "which plaintiff wholly resists" 
confirms the fact that plaintiff proposed, and 
the Court adopted, the trial theory that evidence 
tending to show probability of future zoning was in-
admissible. However, in its brief plaintiff now rec-
ognizes and admits (Br. 22 and 23) that there is 
such an exception to the general rule, but that the 
saving factor which plaintiff can now assert is the 
claim that there was no "foundation" of a probabil-
ity of rezoning. 
In plaintiff's brief on the Motion for New Trial 
which plaintiff filed with Judge Day (R. 137) it 
was stated that "the testimony of William F. Bell 
based upon the proffer of defendants was not admis-
sible and its exclusion was proper," and, further, 
that "it was the decision of the court at the trial ... 
that the proffered testimony of Bell, golf course 
~rchitect, could not be received as bearing on any 
Issue before the trier of fact." The basis suggested 
was two-fold: 
Zoning regulations of the subject tract, on the 
date of assessment of value did not permit 
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and recognize such proscribed use ... 
The foregoing statements are significant be-
cause plaintiff herein recognizes that a proffer of 
proof was made and, further, that the Court actually 
ruled that zoning regulations on the subject tract 
controlled any use to which it could be put for the 
purpose of determining highest and best use, and 
value, in the trial of the matter. Certainly, this indi-
cates that it was .plaintiff's own version of what the 
Court did. 
Coming back to the matter of what counsel for 
plaintiff contends to be a failure on the part of the 
landowners to lay a "foundation" tending to show 
a probability of rezoning, let us examine counsel's 
argument more closely .. Plaintiff did not suggest how 
one should go about laying such a "foundation" or 
just wherein the proffers of proof or excluded testi-
mony failed to measure up to this so-called lack of 
"foundation." And, in view of the objections raised 
to any testimony along the lines tending to show a 
probability of rezoning, it is submitted that plaintiff 
did not define or explain its contention. As a practi-
cal matter, to give real meaning to the word "founda-
tion" tending to establish a probability of rezoning, 
it is evident that it was the attempt by the land-
owners to lay such a foundation which was the very 
thing objected· to repeatedly at every stage of the 
trial by plaintiff. . 
The landowners offered to put on evidence of 
the needs and requirements of the. community and 
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of the tourists and new settlers coming into the area; 
and the likelihood that a community would rezone 
in order to attract new settlers and industry; and 
the consideration of proximity to existing communi-
ties and the available water supply, good lands and 
soils and scenery; and the fact that spot-zoning and 
zoning changes were made immediately to the west 
of the subject property in Middleton; and similar 
conditions. If such evidence fails to lay a "founda-
tion," then the question is, just what kind of evidence 
could be introduced? Further, if a proffer of proof 
(as spelled out in its entirety on pages 19-20 of de-
fendants' prior brief), wherein an offer was made 
to bring the city officials before the court to prove 
that the zoning would be removed, and had been con-
sidered before the condemnation took place, and that 
it was removed shortly after the taking became effec-
tive - as revealed from the minutes of the Washing-
ton City Council meeting, do not come up to the stand-
ards of such a "foundation," then it can be said that 
one lays such a "foundation" only when the zoning 
has in fact been changed And that is what plaintiff 
is really saying in its brief. 
Plaintiff's position on the matter of laying a 
"foundation," is not the law. The quoted cases in 
the landowners' brief to the effect that a probability 
of rezoning can be shown from a variety of factors 
and that an appraiser can consider all of those fac-
~ors, even without bringing affected public officials 
~nto court to indicate what they may or may not do 
if the matter is presented, are so numerous and so 
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greatly in favor of the landowners' position that 
plaintiff cannot meet them head-on. Nor has plain-
tiff tried to meet the law of those cases except by the 
unsupported smoke-screen approach of lack of "foun-
dation." 
From prior quoted excerpts from the Court's 
rulings and plaintiff's objections to testimony, it is 
clear that the Court was excluding any and all ref-
erences to a probability of re-zoning, no matter how 
the issue might come up. The comments on the part 
of the Court and opposing counsel which are set 
forth below show that the Court excluded everything 
on the subject, including that which opposing counsel 
would, without definition, classify as "foundation" 
material: 
THE COURT: 
I don't think you people can present evidence 
here, and I am going to stop you, which will 
show an illegal or improper use of these prem-
ises under the law .... (Tr. 63) 
* * * * 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
... but let it be well known that it is the posi-
tion of the State of Utah in the case that any 
proposed testimony or any statement relative 
to any other use than the- that w~s reco~­
nized and permitted under the zoning ordi-
nance at the time of condemnation are inad-
missible. . . . (Italics added) ( Tr. 103-104) 
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* * * * 
THE COURT: 
The fact of the matter is on September 20, 
which is the date we are concerned with, noth-
ing had happened. It was not annexed to 
Washington City; and my thinking on that 
is it is irrelevant. (Tr. 133) 
* * * * 
THE COURT: 
. . . and my ruling will hold with regard to 
your proffer on the possibility of rezoning it 
will stand. (Tr. 166) 
* * * * 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
We feel that it is purely speculative and con-
jectural to receive evidence with respect to 
whether or not the County Zoning Commis-
sion and the County Commissioners them-
selves may at some time in the future rezone 
the property .... 
* * * * 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
So we look at this property through this view 
that existed the date the service of summons 
was made on the property, and whatever hap-
pened to this property by way of annexation, 
by way of zoning change, would be particu-
larly irrelevant ... (Tr. 36) 
* * * * 
MR. FULLER: 
Before Mr. Campbell answers, I would like 
to speak to one other issue that is before the 
Court that Mr. Campbell raised; and I don't 
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believe that it is in his Brief. It goes to the 
question of whether we are frozen, so to speak, 
with the zoning that existed at the time of 
condemnation. (Tr. 32) 
What Plaintiff is saying when it argues that a 
"foundation" must be laid, is, in reality, a bald state-
ment that no use can be shown for a property unless 
zoning is actually then in effect permitting such a 
use. This is made completely clear by further state-
ments taken from the transcript: 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
We have to assess this property in his answer 
as it was situated with all benefits and all 
detriments on it as it was on September 20, 
1962; and I think as to what Washington 
County might do- I mean- whether Wash-
ington City might make an annexation on Sep-
tember 21 of 1962 or 1963, or 1970 is of no 
concern to us in determining what the value 
of the property was on September 20, 1963. 
(Italics added) (Tr. 132) 
Question put to Mr. Kiepe: 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Did you consider that this 
property did or did not have any value for 
construction of dwellings at that time? 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
Well, now your Honor, we are going to object 
to that. In the first place, it is leading and 
suggestive and calls for an answer that any 
fool can plainly see, and secondly it hasn't 
been established by foundation- well, I think 
that would be proper - there is no foundation 
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for the question until we establish what the 
permitted and recognized use of that land was 
as of the date of condemnation. Once we get 
that, then we can establish the highest and 
best ... (Italics added) (Tr. 134) 
* * * * 
When an attorney, through objections which 
are in turn sustained by the Court defeats a party's 
attempts to lay a foundation and· to put in evidence 
of "probable rezoning" and of actual proof that re-
zoning was contemplated and did in fact come about 
within a short time, he cannot now rely on lack of 
foundation being laid. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS' APPRAISER DID NOT AP-
PRAISE THE CONDEMNED PROPERTIES FOR 
ANY USAGE OTHER THAN FOR COMMER-
CIAL AND SUBDIVISION PURPOSES. 
On page 25 of plaintiff's ·brief it is contended 
that the appraiser for defendants, Werner Kiepe, 
appraised the condemned lands for purposes other 
than for commercial and subdivision uses, and that 
his appraisal was based on a use tied to "limited resi-
dential use tied to small farm acreages." To the con-
trary, Mr. Kiepe was emphatic in his statements 
that such was not the highest and best use of the 
condemned properties, and counsel for. plaintiff cut 
off every attempt by Mr. Kiepe to develop his opinion 
that commercial and residential uses constituted the 
basis for his valuation. 
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Since the transcript itself is much more per-
suasive than unsupported arguments of opposing 
counsel having no foundation in evidence, a look at 
the record is, we think, the answer: 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Well, now, Mr. Kiepe, did 
you give any consideration to the possibility 
that semi-retired persons may locate in this 
area on what would be classified as a small 
farm of two or three acres with a dwelling 
on it? 
A. Well, I think that's a potential; and I would 
assume that it might be, thought I would say 
that that's the exception rather than the rule. 
Q. In your opinion, could this property have 
been sold for that type of usage? 
A. Oh, it could have been sold for that. 
Q. Did you consider that the highest and best 
use of this property was for agricultural use? 
By that I mean crop farming and raising of 
livestock? 
A. No. 
Q. And what did you conclude as to that type 
of usage? 
A. Well, I think it is definitely- when it's 
used, it is going to be used for commercial-
MR. CAMPBELL: 
Now if the Court please, we are going to ob-
ject to that, Your Honor for the same grounds; 
and I think counsel is trying to do indirectly 
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what the Court has said repeatedly cannot be 
done directly. (Tr. 214-215) 
The simple fact of the matter is that Mr. Camp-
bell repeatedly objected to Mr. Kiepe giving testi-
mony as to any highest and best use of the properties 
involved other than that which was specifically per-
mitted under the existing zoning ordinances in effect 
at the time of taking. After sustaining Mr. Camp-
bell's objection, the Court stated that it was con-
cerned with the property "as of last September" 
(Tr. 216), to which defendants answered: 
MR. FULLER: 
That is what we are attempting to determine, 
your Honor, its highest and best use. (Tr. 216) 
The following testimony was the total of de-
fendants' evidence which was received during the 
entire trial - and probably only because no objec-
tion was made by counsel for plaintiff. 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Mr. Kiepe, I will ask you 
this question: Do you have an opinion as to 
what a well-informed purchaser and a well-
informed buyer, that is, the fair market value 
of this land, what they would agree as to the 
market value of the area in green, that is, the 
33.4 7 acres, do you have an opinion as to the 
value that piece of property would have had 
on the market at the time in view of the zon-
ing that was then in effect? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And what is your opinion as to the value 
of that property as of that time? 
A. My opinion is that it was worth $67,000.00, 
which is approximately the rate of $2,000.00 
per acre. (Tr. 216) 
For plaintiff to suggest that Mr. Kiepe had 
departed from his opinion of the highest and best 
use of the property of the date of taking, so as to 
substitute a lesser use of the properties in place of 
what he considered their highest and best use for 
residential and commercial purposes is simply to 
read into the testimony a convenient argument. It 
is quite true that the question put to Mr. Kiepe con-
sidered the zoning that was then in effect, but Mr. 
Kiepe gave his value to the land for residential and 
commercial usage despite the zoning restriction, 
since he considered the zoning carried little weight 
in his appraisal for the reason that the likelihood of 
re-zoning was very probable. The question asked did 
not tie values to uses actually permitted under the 
existing zoning. 
On page 29 of defendants' brief, Mr. Kiepe's 
views on the zoning have been set out, exactly as he 
gave them at the trial. His statements there indicate 
that he recognized the zoning that was in effect, that 
it could be changed, and that it did not preclude con-
sideration of other uses for the properties. 
Mr. Kiepe made it completely clear (Tr. 210) 
that he considered the subject property, because of 
trends in the area and elsewhere, to be adaptable as 
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a settlement for retired people and for commercial 
recreational and residential purposes, and that a 
buyer coming into the area "would certainly give 
great consideration to that potential." Obviously, Mr. 
Kiepe was viewing the value of the property from 
the standpoint of a well-informed purchaser having 
knowledge of facts and conditions totally unrelated 
to small farms or other agricultural uses. This is 
quite clear from the type of objection which was 
made to restrict further testimony along those lines : 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
Excuse me, Mr. Kiepe, if the Court please, 
I'm going to object to any further testimony 
along this line on the ground and for the rea-
son as has been stated heretofore and second-
ly that this witness is apparently looking into 
a crystal ball and telling us what he feels this 
area is going to do in the future or is not going 
to do in the future; and we are talking about 
market value of this subject property in Sep-
tember of 1962, with those restrictions on its 
use at that time. (Tr. 210) 
Further examination of Mr. Kiepe: 
THE WITNESS: 
I think that the Southern Utah area has a 
potential of developing exactly the same type 
of retired, cities and towns of subdivision for 
retireds that they have in other places. 
Q. (Mr. Fuller) When you speak of Southern 
Utah, to what extent do you refer to this St. 
George area? 
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A. I think specifically close to the St. George 
area. I have personally visited a number of 
new settlers in Washington and found they 
were people who had bought and who were 
building because they had retired from their 
homes and were moving into this area. They 
were in some cases Latter-day Saints who 
were interested in the St. George Temple. So 
this is a potential. This is definitely an ad-
vantage here. 
Q. Now, Mr. Kiepe, from the standpoint of the 
subject property, to what extent did you feel 
that it might be adaptable for this special type 
of settler that might come in wanting a home 
or a small acreage or whatever it would be. 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
If the Court please, may I voir dire and make 
an objection? 
THE COURT: 
Yes, if it is a voir dire, you may. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CAMPBELL: 
Q. Mr. Kiepe, at the time you made your ap-
praisal - by the way, what time was that 
when you made your appraisal? 
A. I was down here in November, 1962. 
Q. Did you ever see the property, subject prop-
erty, before the State had commenced work 
on it? 
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A. Yes, there was no work done on it by that 
time. 
Q. And at that time, at the time you saw it 
and at the time you're assessing value of this 
property, are you a ware of what the zoning 
regulations were on the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that zoning called for agricultural 
uses, isn't that correct? 
A. It is zoned for agricultural under the zon-
ing -let's put it differently. It is zoned under 
the agricultural classification. 
Q. And that zoning - have you read a copy 
of the zoning ordinances, by the way? 
A. I have. 
Q. And had you read them before you made 
your appraisal? 
A. No. 
Q. No, you hadn't. But-
A. Wait a minute. 
Q. But the zoning-
A. You said zoning ordinance appraisal, I 
made it in connection with the appraisal. I 
had no occasion to read the zoning ordinance 
before this appraisal. 
Q. Well, before you finally made your final 
conclusion-
A. I made some inquiries about the zoning 
and knew what it was. I hadn't read it, no. 
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Q. And that zone limited the use of these prop-
erties, of this property as the area that the 
State seeks to acquire, for agricultural use 
isn't that correct, things incident to agricul: 
ture, isn't that right? 
A. That is right-
Q. Isn't that right, yes or no? 
A. Partially right. 
MR. CAMPBELL: 
Then, if the Court please, we ask that this 
witness confine himself to testifying with rel31-
tionship to the uses that can be placed on this 
property, and that this property is naturally 
adapted to under those regluations existing at 
that time. (Italics added) (Tr. 211-212-213) 
* * * * 
After further objections and disruptions in the 
proceedings, the matter got back to the direct exami-
nation of Mr. Kiepe. 
MR. FULLER: 
Now would you permit us to go into the in-
vestigation that he made and the considera-
tion he gave to any possibility of rezoning or 
do you wish to exclude us on that? (Italics 
added) 
THE COURT: 
Well, he's already stated that he gave con-
sideration to that. It appears to me, Mr. Ful-
ler, that, sure, there is a possibility. There 
may be even a probability; but the fact of the 
matter is, it hadn't been accomplished. It 
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seems to me we are bound by the facts and 
circumstances as they then were. We are con-
cerned with the land as it was then and as it 
was then classified. Any other use at that 
time, it appears to me, would be illegal and 
improper. The objection is sustained. ( Tr. 
214) 
To prevent a witness having the high qualifica-
tions and reputation of Werner Kiepe from develop-
ing his analysis of the highest and best use of the 
condemned properties as of the date of taking so as 
to justify his valuation figures, to prohibit all evi-
dence- whether it be termed as "foundation" evi-
dence or otherwise, relating to re-zoning or removal 
of zoning restrictions by annexation to Washington 
City and to deny defendants all opportunity of put-
ting in evidence as to uses under the zoning ordi-
nances then existing can not justify plaintiff com-
ing before this court, as stated on page 25 of its brief, 
and saying: 
"Appellants' have had their day in Court; ... " 
Curiously, although plaintiff's trial brief fol-
lows in most part the same brief which was sub-
mitted to Judge Day in Plaintiff's objection to de-· 
fendant's motion for new trial, it would appear that 
plaintiff should have included the same reference 
in the brief before this Court that was made in the 
brief before Judge Day (R. 146) where it was 
argued: 
Kiepe had full occasion to elucidate his opinion 
on highest and best use and value which he 
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so did; that the jury rejected such testimony 
cannot serve as a basis for a new trial. ( R. 
146) 
When the Oourt gave Instruction No. 16 to the 
Jury (to which exception was properly taken Tr. 
441) , the door was closed and the jury had no choice 
but to ignore all references to uses of the subject 
property other than those actually permitted under 
zoning ordinances then in existence. 
The herein quoted material certainly is, we 
think, conclusive. Further reference to the transcript 
by the Court will reveal the fact that the atmosphere 
at the trial was at all other times equally adverse 
to the landowners. 
CONCLUSION 
These defendants' "day in Court" consisted real-
ly of three or four days of futile attempts to present 
a bare shell of a case which might go to a jury as 
to the damages to which they were entitled to recover 
on the basis of the highest and best use of their prop-
erties. Defendant's efforts were rejected at every 
turn by the Court. And, ironically the objections of 
plaintiff's counsel repeatedly made which were more 
in the nature of arguments, rather than objections, 
served as a suitable prelude to Instruction No. 16 
which gave the jury no choice but to grant judgment 
in favor of plaintiff upon values limited to uses ac-
tually permitted under the zoning restrictions in ef-
fect at the time of the condemnation. 
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It is submitted that the interests of justice can 
only be served by granting a new trial. Whether the 
jury may see fit to again award $16,000.00 or per-
haps an even lesser figure, is totally immaterial. A 
landowner brought into Court in a condemnation suit 
is certainly entitled to at least a fair opportunity to 
present testimony and other evidence tending to es-
tablish land values. If the testimony and evidence 
is weak or unsupported then, certainly, the jury can 
carefully weigh that evidence which is admitted, and 
decide accordingly. But to deny such right is to abort 
justice. 
There is another unusual situation presented by 
the nature of a condemnation matter which some of 
our Utah courts have apparently overlooked in their 
analysis of this important type of litigation which 
has developed along with projects of "progress," and 
it deserves careful consideration. A property owner 
is brought into court in a condemnation case as a de-
fendant and against his wishes. Yet, in this un-
wanted position, he bears the burden of proof on 
damages. This situation, and problem, may consist 
of a few words in a sentence to the average reader 
- until he finds his property is being condemned. 
And then the bitter realization strikes home that one 
of the most precious rights in America- the right 
to own private property, is being riddled under the 
guise of public necessity. 
And in the process he must pay for qualified 
appraisers and legal counsel to compete with govern-
mental agencies which are armed to the hilt with 
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experts and unlimited resources for battling the 
small landowners, who did not want to sell in the 
first place, in the hope of getting "just compensa-
tion" for his lands taken and possible damage to his . 
remaining lands. 
A new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN of Backman, 
Backman & Clark, 
1111 Deseret Building 
GLEN E. FULLER, 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for appellants 
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